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AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONFERENCE
JACK STARK*
The prospect of revising the Wisconsin Constitution, exciting as it is,
may overwhelm those who contemplate doing it. In fact, even gathering
and analyzing the materials that one needs in order to consider whether
revision ought to be undertaken are formidable tasks. This conference
allows persons who are interested in the constitution's quality to take a
significant step forward in their deliberations about that quality and
about the correct response to it.
The place from which to begin their journey is the place at which the
conference began: Robert Williams' excellent article.1  Professor
Williams deftly sketches the background of the issue of whether to
revise, that is, to extensively alter rather than make a few amendments
to, the Wisconsin Constitution. He provides useful material about state
constitutions in general and about Wisconsin's in particular, about the
process of revision, and about efforts in other states to revise their
constitutions. Perhaps most helpful is his discussion, which is based on
the experience of other states, about the steps that must be taken if
revision is to be attempted. In short, he creates a relevant and useful
context in relation to which deliberations about revision can effectively
take place.
The most important deliberations about a possible revision would be
a discussion about whether to add, delete, or modify provisions on
substantive grounds. The crucial consideration on these grounds is
avoiding narrow provisions that would be more appropriately taken care
of by means of statutes. These narrow provisions are likely to be
advanced by those who have politically charged motives, not by those
who wish to effect the common good. The worst outcome of
constitutional revision would be the dominance of persons who seek
political advantage, for example, by constitutionalizing positions on
wedge issues. With that general goal in mind, it makes sense to examine
* B.A., Northland College; M.A., Claremont Graduate School; Ph.D., University of
Wisconsin - Madison; J.D., University of Wisconsin - Madison; author of THE WISCONSIN
STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (Reference Guides to the State Constitutions
of the United States, No. 28, G. Alan Tarr series ed., 1997).
1. Robert F. Williams, Is the Wisconsin State Constitution Obsolete? Toward a Twenty-
First Century, Functionalist Assessment, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 425 (2007).
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a few areas where possible substantive changes need to be examined.
The most efficient way to proceed is to discuss the issues that the writers
of the papers for the conference have raised.
Jason Czarnezki's article2 is a first-rate foundation for discussions
about whether the constitution's treatment of the environment
necessitates revision and the ways in which that revision could best be
accomplished. He acknowledges that the public trust doctrine, the
notion that the state has a fiduciary duty in regard to certain natural
resources, applies to only some of the waters of the state and is based on
an expansive reading of the constitutional statement that those waters
are "common highways and forever free."3 He suggests adding a more
explicit statement of the doctrine and expanding it to include all lakes
and streams, and even all natural resources. Other environmental issues
that he would like to see addressed in the constitution include:
withdrawal of ground water; an expansion of trust lands; a broad
statement of the citizens' rights in the environment, for example, a right
to a healthy environment; making the public intervenor a constitutional
office; and striking a balance between environmental protection and
economic development.
As to education, William Niskanen advocates for a constitutional
mandate for a school voucher program.4 He recognizes that by several
measures Wisconsin's schools are doing very well, but he asserts that
they could be made dramatically better, for example, by instituting a
statewide voucher program along the lines of the program that operates
in Milwaukee. He even presents desirable features of such a program.
Craig Maher, Mark Skidmore, and Bambi Statz5 exhaustively explore
school finance in Wisconsin. Implicitly they address the question of the
degree to which the constitutional requirement for a uniform education 6
plays out in fiscal terms. Another possibility for revising the education
article in the constitution comes to mind: other requirements could be
added to the uniformity requirements such as high quality or at least
adequacy. The phrasing of such a requirement is a delicate business.
2. Jason J. Czarnezki, Environmentalism and the Wisconsin Constitution, 90 MARQ. L.
REV. 465 (2007).
3. WIS. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
4. William A. Niskanen, On Wisconsin: Some Friendly Constitutional Advice, 90 MARQ.
L. REV. 701 (2007).
5. Craig Maher, Mark Skidmore & Bambi Statz, State Policy Consequences for
Wisconsin's School Districts: Spending Disparities, Finance Formulas, and Revenue
Restrictions, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 621 (2007).
6. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
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For example, the difference between the cost of an adequate
educational system and one of high quality might be hundreds of
millions of dollars a year.
In the fields of taxation and fiscal policy, Mr. Niskanen7
demonstrates that Wisconsin's economy is in good shape and its
bureaucracy is not bloated. Moreover, he does not support a
constitutional provision like the TABOR (Taxpayers' Bill of Rights)
8provision that was placed in Colorado's constitution. He writes that
amendments like that one limit the rate of growth of state spending to
the inflation rate plus the rate of population growth, but they have not
proved to be stable.9 He suggests instead a set of specific guidelines for
new constitutional provisions that would constrain state revenue and
spending. He proposes adding to the constitution a provision that limits
growth in state expenditures in any fiscal year to a stated percentage of
state general revenues in the second prior fiscal year unless the growth is
approved by a majority in each house of the legislature. He would also
add another provision that would preclude increases in the rate or base
of any state tax without the approval of a referendum. The topic of such
fiscal restraints will likely arise during consideration of constitutional
revision.
After presenting a very large amount of data and analyzing many
other studies, Steven Deller and Judith I. Stallmann ° present their views
on fiscal restraints, sometimes arriving at conclusions that are similar to
Mr. Niskanen's, sometimes disagreeing with him. They point out that
for years analysts of fiscal restraints concluded that taxes were
inconsequential for economic growth, but that very recently a few
studies have muddied the waters, making the relation between the two
inconclusive. They conclude, however, that high taxes are not
necessarily bad for a state's economy, although they recognize a weak
correlation between state (but not local) tax limits and economic
growth, and they provide statistics to support their position. In general,
Professors Deller and Stallmann appear to be unconvinced that
Wisconsin needs a constitutional limit on taxes or revenue.
A very different kind of restraint on the state's spending-on its
nature rather than its amount-is created by the public purpose
7. Niskanen, supra note 4.
8. COLO. CONST. art X, § 20.
9. Niskanen, supra note 4.
10. Steven Deller & Judith I. Stallmann, Tax and Expenditure Limitations and Economic
Growth, 90 MARQ. L. REv 497 (2007).
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doctrine. This doctrine, which the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held
has constitutional status," does not appear explicitly in the constitution.
It might be better if it did appear. Justice Luther Dixon propounded the
doctrine in some early cases, two of which were on taxation. 2 This
doctrine has two aspects. The primary aspect is a requirement that
governmental money may be expended only for a public purpose. That
rule seems non-controversial. The other aspect is a requirement that the
unit of government that levies a tax must be the unit that spends the
proceeds. 3 Michael Libonati, in a fine article, points out that this facet
of the doctrine "has been an obstacle to legislation impacting on
intergovernmental fiscal arrangements."'14 One way to facilitate those
arrangements is to draft a constitutional provision stating the public
purpose doctrine, but rule out the second facet of that doctrine-the one
on spending tax receipts. Reviewing the second part of the doctrine
should occur while reformers consider the constitutional treatment of
local units of government.
Professor Libonati's statement about intergovernmental fiscal
arrangements brings to mind a point that some advocates of local
government have made in the context of possible constitutional revision.
They argue that nothing in the constitution facilitates, and some things
in the constitution impede, regional cooperation, so that agreements to
cooperate must be fashioned by means of contracts. They are right that
some problems affect more than one local unit of government and can
best be addressed by a combination of governmental units. Sometimes
the affected units overlap, such as a city and the county in which it lies.
Sometimes the units are contiguous, such as two adjoining towns.
However, the seriousness of the problem and the needed remedies are
not clear yet. This issue is worth exploring.
Professor Libonati's point about intergovernmental fiscal
arrangements appears in his paper on local units of government. He
brings up a number of issues concerning local units of government that
11. See, e.g., Hopper v. City of Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 120, 128, 256 N.W.2d 139, 142 (1977);
State ex rel. Singer v. Boos, 44 Wis. 2d 374, 381, 171 N.W.2d 307, 311 (1969).
12. Hasbrouck v. City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37, 44 (1860); Soens v. City of Racine, 10
Wis. 214, 223 (1860); Knowlton v. Bd. of Supervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis. 410, 420-21
(1859).
13. See, e.g., Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 579, 247 N.W.2d 141,155 (1962); Brodhead v.
City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 658, 672 (1865).
14. Michael E. Libonati, "Neither Peace nor Uniformity": Local Government in the
Wisconsin Constitution, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 593 (2007).
15. Id.
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ought to be explored. For example, like environmental provisions,
provisions on local units of government appear in various articles in the
constitution rather than in an article exclusively devoted to that topic. It
might be desirable to draft such an article. He also asserts that the
uniformity clause 6 (requiring uniformity in property taxation) also
impedes the rational achievement of fiscal reform. Professor Libonati
looks through the lens of local government at the public trust doctrine,
which has been discussed in the passage on environmental issues, and at
the doctrine of non-delegation, which limits the legislature's authority to
grant powers to local units of government. 7 The bedrock of the
constitutional treatment of local units of government is the home-rule
provision.18 In addition to laying out the main issues on this topic,
Professor Libonati explains the treatment of local units of government
in other state constitutions and provides some wise advice for
constitution-makers who confront these issues.
The issue of separation of powers arises in Jim Rossi's essay.' 9 He
analyzes two recent cases on the state's regulation of Indian gaming and
the contexts in which those cases arose.20 He argues that the principle of
separation of powers has affected that regulation in negative ways. One
solution is to amend the constitution narrowly in ways that affect the
regulation of Indian gaming. Another solution is to cause a much
broader change by altering the scheme of separation of powers. That
second course of action ought to give one pause. First, it would be a
major change and would have many unintended consequences. Second,
the treatment of separation of powers in the Wisconsin Constitution is
actually reasonably flexible. One can see this by comparing it with the
treatment of separation of powers in Iowa's constitution." Both
constitutions vest legislative power in a legislative body, executive
power in the executive branch, and judicial power in a court system. 22
16. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
17. A leading case on this issue is State ex rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 524,
137 N.W. 20, 34 (1912).
18. WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
19. Jim Rossi, Constitutional Isolationism and the Limits of State Separation of Powers as
a Barrier to Interstate Compacts, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 721 (2007).
20. Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 2006 WI 107, 719 N.W.2d 408; Panzer v.
Doyle, 2004 WI 52, 271 Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666.
21. See Jack Stark, A Comparison of the Wisconsin and Iowa Constitutions, 31 RUTGERS
L. J. 1019 (2000). On the separation of powers see id. at 1041-43.
22. IOWA CONST. art III, div. 2, § 1 (legislative), art. IV, § 1 (executive), art.V, § 1
(judicial); WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (legislative), art. V, § 1 (executive), art. VII, § 2 (judicial).
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However, the Iowa Constitution also contains another relevant
provision:
The powers of the government of Iowa shall be
divided into three separate departments-the legislative,
the executive, and the judicial: and no person charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of
these departments shall exercise any function
appertaining to either of the others, except in cases
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted."
As one would expect, Iowa courts, because of that provision,
rigorously enforce the separation of powers doctrine.24 For example,
they are loath to declare statutes unconstitutional, which one could
argue reflects their desire not to assume legislative functions, and they
narrowly interpret the governor's veto power,' which makes it difficult
for the governor to assume legislative powers. In contrast, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court seems to declare legislation unconstitutional
at a slightly higher rate than does the Iowa court 26 and has treated the
governor's veto power as very expansive. 7
Many persons are dismayed by the great effect that reapportionment
has on each party's strength in the legislature, and some of those
persons would raise that issue at a constitutional convention. James
Gardner's article2" addresses reapportionment. One alternative to
reapportionment is to include in the constitution a directive that
electoral districts are to be drawn so as to make as many of them
competitive as possible. Gardner disapproves of that approach because
that would put the election in the hands of swing voters, who tend to be
less interested and less well informed than party loyalists. In contrast,
he defines electoral fairness as the degree to which "the electoral system
produces a legislature in which political parties achieve representation
23. IOWA CONST. art. Il1, div. 1, § 1.
24. Stark, supra note 21, at 1041.
25. Id. at 1035-40.
26. Id. at 1032.
27. See Benjamin W. Proctor, Comment, Wisconsin's Chief Legislator: The Governor's
Partial Veto Authority and the New Tipping Point, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 739 (2007).
28. James A. Gardner, What Is "Fair" Partisan Representation, and How Can It Be
Constitutionalized? The Case for a Return to Fixed Election Districts, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 555
(2007). The constitutional provisions on reapportionment are WIS. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3-5.
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in proportion to their support in the electorate., 2' He believes that the
greatest impediment to that result is the commitment to single-member,
territorial election districts. He prefers a system in which the
boundaries between districts would remain constant, but the number of
delegates allotted to each district would vary as the population of the
districts varies. His paper is a good starting point in the debate on this
issue.
Governors and their staff members probably approve of the
Wisconsin Constitution's treatment of the issue of gubernatorial vetoes;
but, it is likely that the citizens of the state, if properly informed, would
prefer to alter that treatment because the veto power in this state is
generally regarded as the broadest in the country.30 Benjamin Proctor
takes up this issue in his well-researched comment.3' As he points out,
the root of the problem is a Wisconsin Supreme Court holding that
"part" in the constitutional section on vetoes means the smallest
imaginable portion.32  One result of this initial interpretation is the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's approval of a veto that consisted of the
lining out of a dollar amount and the writing in of a lower amount.
There would almost certainly be substantial support at a constitutional
convention for a limitation of the veto authority.
For years, the only significant requirement for vetoes was that the
material left after the veto must be "a complete, entire, and workable
law."'  Later, the constitution was amended to prohibit creating new
words by rejecting individual letters.35 More recently, the Wisconsin
legislature passed, on first consideration,36 an amendment that would
forbid creating by veto a new sentence that is composed of parts of more
than one sentence. 37 The case law has recently produced a significant
restriction, holding that the material left after a veto must be germane to
(have the same subject matter as) the material from which it was
29. Gardner, supra note 28.
30. WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10.
31. Proctor, supra note 27.
32. Id.; see, e.g., State ex rel. Wis. Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 313, 260 N.W. 486, 491
(1935).
33. Citizens Util. Bd. v. Klauser, 194 Wis. 2d 485, 485, 534 N.W.2d 608, 608 (1995).
34. See Wis. Tel. Co., 218 Wis. at 314, 260 N.W.2d at 491.
35. WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10(1)(c).
36. See Id. art. XII, § 1 (stating that to be successful a proposed constitutional
amendment must pass the legislature in identical form in two successive legislatures and then
be ratified by the people).
37. Assemb. J. Res. 68, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005); Enrolled J. Res. 40, 97th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
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fashioned.3 8 If the vetoes of the most recent budget bill that got the
most attention had been challenged,39 they would most likely have been
reviewed in light of that principle. With two related vetoes the
Governor effected a transfer of several hundred million dollars from the
transportation fund to the general fund. The money transferred would
ultimately increase school aid. In both of those vetoes, the germaneness
requirement appears to have been violated. Most of the material that
was vetoed was about particular transportation projects, and some of it
was about the unfunded liability of the state's retirement system. Thus,
there are some checks on the governor's veto power, but many persons
would like there to be even more.
Joseph Ranney, the authority on Wisconsin legal history,
contributed an article that serves two purposes.' ° One purpose is to
make several suggestions about reforming the Wisconsin Constitution.
He advocates eschewing "housekeeping" measures, those that have to
do with administrative details of government such as the materials on
the terms of office for local officials.41  He also is opposed to
amendments on controversial social policies, such as the amendment
defining marriage that was approved by the voters in November 2006.
He would make amending the constitution more difficult by changing to
two-thirds the margin needed, in the legislature or in a referendum, to
amend the document.
Mr. Ranney's second purpose is to offer suggestions on substantive
provisions. His more controversial suggestions are eliminating the
uniformity clause42 and the internal improvements section.43 He notes
that the uniformity clause was designed for a system of taxation that
consisted almost entirely of the property tax and that the clause is less
appropriate for a more complicated system. However, under the case
law, the clause applies only to the property tax.' Some would oppose
eliminating the clause, partly because virtually every state has such a
38. See State ex rel. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 437, 424 N.W.2d 385,
387-88 (1988).
39. 2005-2007 Budget Act, Act 25, 2005 Wis. Sess. Laws 1.
40. Joseph A. Ranney, Wisconsin's Constitutional Amendment Habit: A Disease or a
Cure?, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 667 (2007).
41. WIS. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
42. See Id. art. VIII, § 1; Jack Stark, The Uniformity Clause of the Wisconsin
Constitution, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 577 (1993).
43. See WiS. CONST. art. VIII, § 10; Jack Stark, A History of the Internal Improvements
Section of the Wisconsin Constitution, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 829.
44. Stark, supra note 42, at 585-98.
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provision. Moreover, both provisions are bulwarks against favoritism
and potentially against corruption." A contrary view is that the clause
and section should be retained, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court
should enforce them more vigorously than it has recently done. For
example, in the most recent uniformity clause case, a property tax
exemption for airlines that have a hub in Wisconsin was held to be
constitutional.' The exemption applied to only two airlines, and other
airlines that operated in the state, including the plaintiff, were required
to pay a tax on their in-state property. In the leading case on such
situations, the court held that a complete exemption for a university's
property was unconstitutional because other institutions of higher
education received an exemption for only forty acres. 7  The court
reasoned that it was not uniform to treat the property within a class
differently.' The attorney general has agreed with that proposition. 9
Thus, the most recent case seems to be an anomaly.
The list of major substantive issues that the papers raise is very
nearly comprehensive. However, there should probably be one more
effort to ensure that the list is complete. One missing topic that comes
to mind is takings or condemnation-governmental acquiring of private
property for public purposes." This is a topic that has often been in the
news recently, primarily because of a controversial and well-publicized
Supreme Court decision on the takings provision in the United States
Constitution.' Except for the omission of "private" as a modifier of
property, the Wisconsin section52 on this topic is identical to part of the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 3 However, unlike its
practice in regard to most of the sections in article I that have analogues
in the U.S. Constitution, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not followed
federal case law in its interpretation of this section. The takings section
is very brief, and many of the cases turn on a careful examination of the
facts because there is no clear line between constitutional and
45. Id. at 580.
46. Nw. Airlines v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 2006 WI 88, 14, 293 Wis. 2d 202, 1 14, 717
N.W.2d 280, 1 14.
47. Bd. of Tr. of Lawrence Univ. v. Outagamie County, 150 Wis. 244, 246, 136 N.W. 619,
623 (1912). The other colleges' exemptions were probably unconstitutional also because they
were partial. See Stark, supra note 42, at 599-600.
48. Bd. of Tr. of Lawrence Univ., 150 Wis. at 246, 136 N.W. at 623.
49. 54 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 60 (1965); 40 Op. Wis. Att'y Gen. 419 (1951).
50. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 13.
51. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
52. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 13.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
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unconstitutional public action. The primary question for constitutional
reformers on this point is whether the case law has led to a rational
distinction between public and private purposes. One possible revision
that comes to mind is to add "damaging" to "taking" as a type of action
that is impermissible without just compensation. Another possibility is
to spell out some of the actions that are public uses. In the latter regard,
the court in the federal case held that economic development, that is,
benefits for corporations, is a public purpose.'
The uniformity clause case on airlines raises the issue of the proper
response of constitutional reformers to case law that is inconsistent."
One response, of course, is to do nothing and wait for the courts to
correct themselves, an outcome that is not assured. A reformer could
also argue that constitutions ought to be general and should not contain
provisions that in essence are directions to the courts about the proper
way to interpret general provisions. The other view is that a
constitution can properly accommodate such directions. For example,
in regard to the uniformity clause, one could add to it a statement that
all the members of a class of property must be treated uniformly.
The first step in the analysis of the uniformity clause is to decide
whether anything should be done. If the decision is to go ahead with
specific provisions, the second and more laborious step is to determine
the material that should be added in response to unfortunate case law.
In addition to the vital substantive issues that are pertinent to our
deliberations, a constitutional reformer should dispose of three less
important matters, including the constitution's structure, removal of
extraneous provisions, and cosmetic changes. Even great deficiencies in
these areas do not make revision of the constitution necessary.
Moreover, great deficiencies in them would not convert any citizen to
advocacy of revision. Nevertheless, deficiencies are just that, and they
ought to be remedied if more important matters are to be addressed. In
fact, these problems are unlikely to be solved unless they are solved in
conjunction with a major substantive revision.
The first class of minor problems relates to the constitution's
structure. For example, in his incisive article, Jason Czarnezki points
out that "the constitution details financial provisions related to forests
and minerals, creates the Commission of Public Lands, establishes
jurisdiction of rivers and lakes providing the foundation for the public
54. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480-89.
55. Nw. Airlines v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 2006 WI 88, J 14, 293 Wis. 2d 202, 14, 717
N.W.2d 280, 1 14.
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trust doctrine, and contains the recently enacted right to hunt and fish
amendment. 5 6  Those four topics appear in four articles of the
constitution." Particularly if Professor Czarnezki is right that a number
of environmental provisions ought to be added to the constitution, it
might be rational to combine the current and new provisions, if any, into
a separate article on the environment. That would both make them
easier to find and underline their importance.
Another type of minor revision that should be made concerns the
removal of extraneous provisions, those that are undesirable not
because they are substantively flawed but because they are superfluous.
Among the candidates for omission are provisions about the prohibition
of slavery, 8 the acceptance of the enabling act (allowing the Territory of
Wisconsin to proceed toward statehood),59 the disposition of territorial
lands,' ° the transition from territory to state, 6' and the transition to a
new judicial system.62 Other candidates are the provisions that are
based on the assumption that this state is a military power.63 Still other
candidates for deletion are such provisions as "The blessings of a free
government can only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice,
moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent
recurrence to fundamental principles."'  That statement is more in the
nature of a civics lesson and seems inappropriate in a constitution, but it
was cited in a case.65 Provisions are likely to be extraneous if they have
not been amended or litigated. However, the absence of litigation is not
a sure indicator that a provision ought to be removed. An example of
such a provision is the prohibition of religious tests for office.6 That
seems to be a worthwhile protection.
Finally, the constitution would benefit from some cosmetic changes.
For example, some archaic and redundant words and phrases can be
eliminated. Also, some cleaning-up for the sake of consistency is
desirable. As to that second goal, sprinkled throughout the constitution
56. Czarnezki, supra note 2.
57. WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 7, art. X, § 7, art. IX, § 1, art. I, § 26.
58. Id. art. I, § 2.
59. Id. art. II, § 2.
60. Id. art. IX, § 2.
61. Id. art. XIV, §§ 1-2.
62. Id. art. XIV, § 16.
63. Id. art. I, § 20, art. IV, § 29, art. V, §§ 4, 7 (2), art. VIII, § 7 (1).
64. Id. art. 1, § 22.
65. Stierle v. Rohmeyer, 218 Wis. 149, 167, 260 N.W. 647, 655 (1935).
66. WIS. CONST. art. I, § 19.
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in eighty-four places are brief phrases that refer to the enactment of
statutory law.67 They are phrased in fifteen ways.6 Most importantly,
they indicate that the constitutional provision in which they appear is
not self-executing; that is, it does not by itself create rights, duties, or
responsibilities but must be implemented by the enactment of a statute
or statutes. 69 They also impose a duty to legislate, do not authorize
shams, can be supplemented by court-fashioned restrictions and
qualifications, and do not grant exclusive authority.7" Surprisingly, they
have frequently been relevant in litigation.71 Consistency in regard to
them would be desirable. One can attain it by using one phrase, such as
"by statute," in each place.
Returning to Mr. Ranney's fine article, one notes that the bulk of it
is a historical study of the amendments to the constitution. He finds
that certain themes emerge in the various periods into which he divides
that history. He also considers the Wisconsin Constitution to be stable
compared to those of other states. His statement that "the patterns of
amendment and amendment rejection over the course of the state's
history provide clues as to what parts of the constitution might usefully
be changed by reformers"73 is supported by his analysis. Studying those
patterns also helps persons who are considering constitutional reform to
determine whether a constitutional convention or a series of
amendments ought to be undertaken.74 Mr. Ranney is skeptical about
the benefits of a constitutional convention: "Wisconsin's constitutional
system has in the main been successful. The reforms discussed above
would likely be useful, but it is far from certain that a new constitution is
the best way to achieve them."75  Others would argue that extensive
constitutional revision is desirable, perhaps necessary.
Answering the question that Mr. Ranney poses about the likely
efficacy of major constitutional revision is the next step for reformers,
and it requires more analysis. The proceedings of this conference have
67. See Jack Stark, Enigmatic Grants of Law-Making Rights and Responsibilities in the
Wisconsin Constitution, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 961, 961-62 nn.2-16 (1998).
68. Id. at 961-62.
69. Id. at 965.
70. Id. at 969-70, 973.
71. See id. at 962-63.
72. Ranney, supra note 40.
73. Id.
74. On that question it should be noted that an amendment may address only one issue.
WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 1. Thus, if there are many problems, there must be many
amendments to remedy them.
75. Ranney, supra note 40.
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allowed reformers to address this question in a more rational and better
informed way. They need even more material like the kind that this
conference has produced, and they need to inform the citizens of this
state about the benefits that revision is likely to bring. After that
information is distributed, they need to determine the level of
receptivity to a convention that ordinary citizens and political leaders
have. Reformers need to remember that revising the constitution is not
a panacea. If the legislative and executive branches ignore the
constitution and the judicial branch incorrectly interprets it, the benefits
of revision will be attenuated. Regardless of the final decision about
whether to proceed with a convention, the decision-making process that
this conference has so substantially advanced will be good for the
constitution and, thus, good for Wisconsin.
* * *
